FB quick-backup-restore

Restic-powered encrypted time machine for OpenClaw: hourly incremental snapshots, fast restore by time/snapshot/file, local-only privacy defaults, integrity checks, retention, and optional alerts. Setup can run with sudo, install dependencies, create systemd/cron persistence, restore over current files, and prune or purge recovery data.

Not recommendedlow grade F

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Marz v3.2.3 MIT-0 20 files · 9 scripts body ≈ 2 460 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

Generator Infrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text

Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode

JSON

Technical rating

34/100

safety, quality, tests

Safety 60%: 8
Quality 40%: 73
Run on models: none yet

Process rating

65/100

Nearly there

Result and completion w 14: 0
Inputs and preconditions w 11: 0
When it triggers w 12: 20

the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.

For the model run — optional

Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 24

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 24

medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence bin/setup.sh:92

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
```
echo "  - Register /etc/cron.d/time-clawshine (preserves schedule.cron exactly)"
```
code literal
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence bin/setup.sh:98

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
```
echo "  - Register /etc/cron.d/time-clawshine"
```
code literal
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence bin/setup.sh:122

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
```
[[ -f "/etc/cron.d/quick-backup-restore" ]]        && v2_a…cts+=("/etc/cron.d/quick-backup-restore")
```
code literal
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence bin/setup.sh:415

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
```
CRON_FILE="/etc/cron.d/time-clawshine"
```
code literal
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence bin/status.sh:87

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
```
CRON_FILE="/etc/cron.d/time-clawshine"
```
code literal
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence bin/uninstall.sh:32

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
```
echo "  - Cron job (/etc/cron.d/time-clawshine)"
```
code literal
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence CHANGELOG.md:15

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
```
- Fall back to `/etc/cron.d/time-clawshine` for cron expressions that cannot be
```
quoted
medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence CHANGELOG.md:247

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
```
- `/etc/cron.d/quick-backup-restore` → `/etc/cron.d/time-clawshine`
```
quoted
medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell README.md:333

Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
```
use `curl | bash`.
```
quoted
medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SETUP_GUIDE.md:180

Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
```
sudo bash {baseDir}/bin/setup.sh
```
medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SETUP_GUIDE.md:192

Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
```
sudo bash {baseDir}/bin/status.sh
```
medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SETUP_GUIDE.md:204

Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
```
sudo bash {baseDir}/bin/uninstall.sh
```
medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SETUP_GUIDE.md:211

Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
```
sudo bash {baseDir}/bin/uninstall.sh --purge
```
medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:20

Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
```
sudo bash {baseDir}/bin/setup.sh
```
medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:74

Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
```
sudo bash {baseDir}/bin/status.sh
```
medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:82

Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
```
sudo bash {baseDir}/bin/setup.sh
```
medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:86

Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
```
sudo bash {baseDir}/bin/setup.sh --no-system-install
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process bin/setup.sh:387

Starts a background / autostarted process
```
systemctl enable --now time-clawshine.timer
```
low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence bin/setup.sh:394

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
```
for legacy_cron in "/etc/cron.d/quick-backup-restore" "/etc/cron.d/time-clawshine"; do
```
detectorcode literal
low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence bin/uninstall.sh:77

Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
```
for cron_file in "/etc/cron.d/time-clawshine" "/etc/cron.d/quick-backup-restore"; do
```
detectorcode literal
low Secrets in code secret-telegram-bot config.yaml:61

Telegram bot token (placeholder value)
```
# Exemplo: 1234…AHx…
```
placeholder
low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url lib.sh:228

Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
```
"https://api.telegram.org/bot${TG_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \
```
placeholder
low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege skill.json:59

Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
```
"command": "sudo bash {baseDir}/bin/setup.sh"
```
code literal

low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:4

Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; security demo / example)

metadata: { "openclaw": { "emoji": "⏱", "requires": { "bins": ["bash", "openssl", "curl", "jq"], "auto_install": ["restic", "yq"] }, "install": [{ "id": "setup", "kind": "shell", "label": "Run Time Cl

detectordemo

Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
100Tools and files. No external tools needed
100Steps. 28 steps
100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2460 tokens
100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
100Progress reporting. Reports progress

medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

+5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
+4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
+3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
+2Single-language instructions
+3Description length 338: enough signal without eating the budget
+4Structure: 16 headings
+3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
+4Has examples (28 code blocks)
+1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: clean

This is a clearly disclosed local backup and restore skill with high system access, but its behavior is purpose-aligned and external sharing is off by default.

LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 1 Jun 2026

Tests

— no evals.json

— no spec.yaml

— not run on models

Files · 20

bin/backup.sh 8K
bin/customize.sh 10K
bin/prune.sh 7K
bin/restore.sh 7K
bin/setup.sh 21K
bin/status.sh 5K
bin/test.sh 11K
bin/uninstall.sh 8K
CHANGELOG.md 20K
config.yaml 5K
lib.sh 19K
LICENSE.txt 1K
MARKETPLACE.md 1K
PRIVACY.md 2K
README.md 12K
SECURITY.md 2K
SETUP_GUIDE.md 6K
skill-card.md 3K
skill.json 2K
SKILL.md 11K

Frontmatter

metadata: {"openclaw":{"emoji":"⏱","requires":{"bins":["bash","openssl","curl","jq"],"auto_install":["restic","yq"]},"install":[{"

Dates

In catalog since 5 Mar 2026

Updated in catalog 1 Jun 2026

First seen here 10 Sept 2026

Last analysis 11 Sept 2026, 02:39 UTC

Last seen in crawl 10 h ago

Score history

Date		Score	Safety	Qual.
10 Sept 2026	F	34	8	73