SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BD hostinger-vps-deploy

Set up Hostinger VPS servers as AI virtual employees with GUI and Koda (OpenClaw). Use when deploying new VPS instances, setting up remote desktops, installing Koda/OpenClaw, or configuring AI agent workstations. Handles Ubuntu server setup, GUI (XFCE + VNC/XRDP), Docker, and Koda deployment.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: maverick-software v1.0.0 22 files · 14 scripts body ≈ 2 112 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureDockerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 14

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 14
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/03-install-docker.sh:16
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh
      vendor-host
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/hostinger-views.ts:230
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      ["bill…tV1", "Browse VPS plans and pricing"],
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/hostinger-views.ts:231
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      ["bill…tV1", "List payment methods"],
      quoted
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/01-server-setup.sh:91
      Starts a background / autostarted process
      systemctl enable fail2ban
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/02-install-gui.sh:51
      Starts a background / autostarted process
      systemctl enable xrdp
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/03-install-docker.sh:27
      Starts a background / autostarted process
      systemctl enable docker
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/security/harden-server.sh:78
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      systemctl enable auditd
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/security/setup-cloudflare-tunnel.sh:25
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      systemctl enable cloudflared
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/security/setup-https.sh:58
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      systemctl enable certbot.timer
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host scripts/security/setup-tailscale.sh:15
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/security/setup-tailscale.sh:19
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      systemctl enable tailscaled
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/security/setup-wireguard.sh:75
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      systemctl enable wg-quick@wg0
      security skill
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:63
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | `bill…tV1` | GET | `/api/billing/v1/catalog` |
      table
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:64
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | `bill…tV1` | GET | `/api/billing/v1/payment-methods` |
      table

    Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (hostinger-vps-deploy) differs from the folder (hostinger-vps-mcp-tools)
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 36 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2112 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -31 of 7 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 293: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 23 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill does what it claims, but it gives broad infrastructure and root-level authority with risky defaults that users should review before installing.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026