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BF admirarr

Manage a Jellyfin/Plex + *Arr media server stack — check status, add content, monitor downloads, diagnose issues, restart services. Use this when the user asks about their media server, downloads, movies, TV shows, or streaming setup.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Max Techera v1.0.0 MIT-0 80 files · 1 script body ≈ 986 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 30/100 · Will not run — weak spots: steps, result and completion, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationDockerAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
30/100
Will not run
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc install.sh:187
      Writes to a shell startup file
      printf "    ${DIM}echo 'export PATH=\"%s:\$PATH\"' >> ~/.bashrc${RESET}\n" "$INSTALL_DIR"
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc install.sh:188
      Writes to a shell startup file
      printf "    ${DIM}echo 'export PATH=\"%s:\$PATH\"' >> ~/.zshrc${RESET}\n" "$INSTALL_DIR"
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell README.md:35
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://get.admirarr.dev | sh
      vendor-host
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell README.md:305
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://get.admirarr.dev | sh
      vendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:5
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment; the skill's own vendor host)
      #   curl -fsSL https://get.admirarr.dev | sh
      commentvendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:8
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment; the skill's own vendor host)
      #   wget -qO- https://get.admirarr.dev | sh
      commentvendor-host
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal internal/api/client_test.go:285
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (detector / deny-list definition; test fixture / example file)
      t.Errorf("expected X-Api-Key=seer…456, got %s", got)
      detectorfixture

    Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 30/100

    • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (admirarr) differs from the folder (nexus-cli)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 986 tokens
    • low The response is described with custom markup (9 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3No numbered steps or checklist
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 234: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 12 headings

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This media-server admin skill is mostly coherent, but it needs review because it can collect local API keys, change Docker services and media-stack configuration, delete download data, and delegate fixes to external AI tools.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026