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CD openclaw-expert

Complete OpenClaw reference: architecture, gateway, CLI (50+ commands), 25+ channels, 25+ providers, tools, plugins, automation, security, installation, platforms. Use when answering OpenClaw config/setup/behavior questions, debugging issues (gateway, channels, failover, sandboxing, heartbeat, cron), writing openclaw.json, setting up channels (WhatsApp/Telegram/Discord/Signal/Slack/iMessage/etc.), configuring providers (Anthropic/OpenAI/Gemini/xAI/Ollama/MiniMax/etc.), managing agents/sessions/memory/workspace, CLI commands, automation (cron/hooks/heartbeat/tasks), installing on any platform (macOS/Linux/Windows/Docker/VPS/RPi/iOS/Android), using tools (exec/browser/image/video/TTS/music/sub-agents/ACP), plugins, security hardening, troubleshooting, or gateway protocol. NOT for writing OpenClaw source code.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: maxwellmelo v1.0.0 MIT-0 15 files body ≈ 3 080 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

ReferenceSlackDiscordTelegramWhatsAppAI and agentsSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
69/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
56
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 28

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 28
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/02-gateway.md:1198
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      <!-- ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.ssh-tunnel.plist -->
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/09-installation.md:497
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      rm -f ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/09-installation.md:909
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      schtasks /create /tn "WSL Boot" /tr "wsl.exe -d Ubuntu --exec /bin/true" /sc onstart /ru SYSTEM
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/11-platforms.md:278
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      schtasks /create /tn "WSL Boot" /tr "wsl.exe -d Ubuntu --exec /bin/true" /sc onstart /ru SYSTEM
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/04-channels.md:2052
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      curl "https://api.telegram.org/bot<bot_token>/getUpdates"
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal references/04-channels.md:2287
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)
      accessToken: "oaut…...",
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/07-plugins.md:377
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      // publicUrl: "https://example.ngrok.app/voice/webhook",
      placeholder
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/09-installation.md:29
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash
      security skillvendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/09-installation.md:58
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install-cli.sh | bash
      security skillvendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/09-installation.md:111
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash
      security skillvendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/09-installation.md:308
      Writes to a shell startup file (documentation of a security skill)
      echo 'source ~/.clawdock/clawdock-helpers.sh' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/09-installation.md:416
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo chmod 600 /swapfile
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/09-installation.md:419
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      echo '/swapfile none swap sw 0 0' | sudo tee -a /etc/fstab
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/09-installation.md:420
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      echo 'vm.swappiness=10' | sudo tee -a /etc/sysctl.conf
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/09-installation.md:451
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      echo 'gpu_mem=16' | sudo tee -a /boot/config.txt
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/11-platforms.md:212
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo tee /etc/wsl.conf >/dev/null <<'EOF'
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/11-platforms.md:762
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo chmod 600 /swapfile
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/11-platforms.md:765
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      echo '/swapfile none swap sw 0 0' | sudo tee -a /etc/fstab
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/11-platforms.md:766
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
      echo 'vm.swappiness=10' | sudo tee -a /etc/sysctl.conf
      security skill

    A further 9 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (openclaw-expert) differs from the folder (openclaw-expert-guide)
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 9 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3080 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Description length 818: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (12 of 12)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a documentation-only OpenClaw guide, but it includes copy-paste commands and sensitive provider/workspace guidance that need careful review before use.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026