SKILLEMALL.ai

FD download-aio

Download videos, audio, playlists, subtitles, and thumbnails from ANY platform (YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, Facebook, Twitter/X, Twitch, Vimeo, SoundCloud, Reddit, and 1000+ more) using yt-dlp. After download, automatically send file to Telegram if under 50MB. Use this skill when the user wants to download video, audio, playlist, reel, short, clip, subtitle, or thumbnail from any website or social media platform. Triggers on phrases like "tải video", "download video", "tải nhạc", "download audio", "tải playlist", "download từ YouTube/TikTok/Facebook/Instagram", "lưu video", "save video", or when user pastes a URL from a video platform.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: MCB AI v1.0.0 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 872 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ProcedureTelegramYouTubeMedia and videotype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
F
37/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
93
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 16

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/commands.md:122
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    --cookies-from-browser chrome
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/troubleshooting.md:22
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    Hoặc dùng --cookies-from-browser chrome
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/troubleshooting.md:28
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    Fix: --cookies-from-browser chrome
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/troubleshooting.md:34
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    Fix: --cookies-from-browser chrome
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/troubleshooting.md:62
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    Fix: --cookies-from-browser chrome (nếu đã follow account đó)
Medium and low: 11
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:69
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File $env:USERPROFILE\.agents\skills\download-aio\scripts\install.ps1
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store README.md:141
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation table row)
    | Video cần đăng nhập | Mở Chrome, đăng nhập, agent dùng `--cookies-from-browser chrome` |
    table
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/commands.md:128
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    # Dùng extension "Get cookies.txt LOCALLY" trên Chrome
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/platforms.md:27
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation table row)
    | Instagram | Đăng nhập để xem private | `--cookies-from-browser chrome` |
    table
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/platforms.md:28
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation table row)
    | Twitter/X | Một số video cần login | `--cookies-from-browser chrome` |
    table
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/platforms.md:29
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation table row)
    | YouTube (private) | Video private/members | `--cookies-from-browser chrome` |
    table
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/platforms.md:30
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation table row)
    | Twitch (sub-only) | Kênh subscription | `--cookies-from-browser chrome` |
    table
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/platforms.md:31
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation table row)
    | Facebook (private) | Group/profile riêng tư | `--cookies-from-browser chrome` |
    table
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:15
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts/install.ps1
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:113
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Nội dung private (Instagram, Twitter): dùng `--cookies-from-browser chrome`
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store README.md:140
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (detector / deny-list definition; documentation table row)
    | HTTP 429 / Rate limit | Agent tự thêm delay, hoặc dùng `--cookies-from-browser chrome` |
    detectortable

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 25 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 872 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 8 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 643: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This media downloader is mostly coherent, but it deserves Review because it can use browser login cookies and automatically send downloaded files to Telegram without a separate confirmation step.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026