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BC oh-my-opencode

Multi-agent orchestration plugin for OpenCode. Use when the user wants to install, configure, or operate oh-my-opencode — including agent delegation, ultrawork mode, Prometheus planning, background tasks, category-based task routing, model resolution, tmux integration, or any oh-my-opencode feature. Covers installation, configuration, all agents (Sisyphus, Oracle, Librarian, Explore, Atlas, Prometheus, Metis, Momus), all categories, slash commands, hooks, skills, MCPs, and troubleshooting.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: McOso v1.0.0 7 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 4 909 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:26
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bash
      vendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/doctor.sh:27
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed; the skill's own vendor host)
      echo "  Install: curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bash"
      code literalvendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host scripts/doctor.sh:40
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (string literal in code, not executed)
      echo "  Install Bun: curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash"
      code literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/run-ulw.sh:49
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed; the skill's own vendor host)
      echo "Install: curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bash"
      code literalvendor-host

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4909 tokens
    • 100Steps. 52 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 494: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 39 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 52 items
    • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This appears to be a legitimate OpenCode orchestration skill, but it asks users to enable broad autonomous agent behavior and includes risky unpinned or remote-code installation paths.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026