SKILLEMALL.ai

CD model-checker

查询公司内部可用AI模型列表。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: mcp98252302 v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 46 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 36/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: steps, result and completion, when it triggers

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
43
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
36/100
Unfinished process
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:18
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…9dM/mwVgvbZJaSNaRk+bshk…Kbz+IoId…W0Q==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:48
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…SDq+2kAA…MOe/+5cdoEdg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:83
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…FrF+LTRo…W3g==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:92
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…A6j+hAmM…GbS+kf5c…csw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:101
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…5bm+c2gQ…aG5+esrLODihIorn+Pe6F…dXA==",
    detector

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-short description under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 36/100

  • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 46 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 15: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3No numbered steps or checklist
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -15SKILL.md body under 300 characters: nearly empty
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 3 headings
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 43.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill simply fetches a disclosed list of internal AI models from one stated company API endpoint, with no evidence of hidden local access or persistence.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 28 May 2026