AC wagmios
Give your OpenClaw agent a homelab. Use when managing Docker containers, installing marketplace apps, or any Docker-related tasks on behalf of the user. Scope-based API key permissions — agent can only do what the key allows. On Linux, Docker requires sudo — without root access, WAGMIOS is the only safe interface for agent homelab control. Supports multi-machine management — one agent can manage multiple WAGMIOS instances across different hosts, each with its own scoped key. Requires X-API-Key header on every request (user provides at runtime). Includes Docker installation check and startup validation.
As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/docker-install.md:72Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionsecho "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/etc/apt/keyrings/docker.gpg] https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu $(lsb_release -cs) stable" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processreferences/docker-install.md:83Starts a background / autostarted processsudo systemctl enable docker
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processreferences/docker-install.md:95Starts a background / autostarted processsudo systemctl enable docker
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-background-processreferences/docker-install.md:105Starts a background / autostarted processsudo systemctl enable docker
Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 18 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1071 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 609: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (6 of 6)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.