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AC humancanhelp

Use for a short local human handoff when an AI workflow is blocked on a visual or interactive step / 当 AI 工作流卡在视觉或交互步骤时，可用本工具进行短时本地人工接手

ClawHub Agent Skills author: metalony v1.0.2 MIT-0 12 files body ≈ 1 985 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:235
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…l1I+R1H7…G3i/cYFJ…fIw==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:269
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…XcW+/GvMN…kxZ/opySAZMrc+9LY/WyjA…InQ==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:286
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…qEP+UeRV…fdw==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:320
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…Fnw/+3lVx…cQS+Yu6w==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:422
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…UzV+AA46…P4O+ng17CA==",
      detector

    Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (humancanhelp) differs from the folder (hcl)
    • 70Failures and branches. 4 branches
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 24 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1985 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 135: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
    • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a disclosed remote handoff tool, but it can expose live browser or desktop control over LAN or public URLs without mandatory authentication, so users should review it carefully.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026