DD clawpurse
(no description)
Not recommendedlow grade D
As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Risky intent medium severity
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
If you install
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
For the author
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 12
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 12
-
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsdocs/TRUST-MODEL.md:131Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target| Social engineering | Never share mnemonic or keystore file |
-
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsdocs/TRUST-MODEL.md:252Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- [ ] Verify keystore file has 0600 permissions
-
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsREADME.md:347Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- ✅ **Never share** your mnemonic or keystore file
-
medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretssrc/security.ts:188Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target* Validate mnemonic phrase
-
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:105High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…oyg+GOH3rYX++Kpzr…3Nk+U8XO…syg==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:118High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…VHO+q2xB…AGd+Kl0mmq/MprG…MzA==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:173High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…VHO+q2xB…AGd+Kl0mmq/MprG…MzA==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:350High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"integrity": "sha5…ywo+qwL+oL8H…C1U+vRfLQDvw==",
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:366High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha512-Yqfm+XDx0+Prh3…1yC+JWZ2…IL7+vK+Clp7…D7g==",
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsTEST_PLAN.md:261Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (test fixture / example file)- Keystore file has 0600 permissions
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsTEST_PLAN.md:339Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (test fixture / example file)- Keystore file corrupted
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsTEST_PLAN.md:342Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (test fixture / example file)- Keystore file missing
fixture
Files scanned: 39. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 19 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1333 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 24 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
- +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
ClawPurse appears to be a real local blockchain wallet, but it needs Review because its agent-facing guidance normalizes automated fund transfers with confirmation and allowlist bypasses.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026