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AC lock-me-in

Remote browser login and session persistence for headless servers. Start an interactive browser session via a temporary public URL (cloudflared tunnel), let the user log in visually, then persist cookies/localStorage for future automated use. Use when: (1) a website requires login before the agent can interact with it, (2) the user says 'log me in' or 'I need to log in to X', (3) automated browsing needs saved credentials, (4) the agent needs to access authenticated pages (LinkedIn, job boards, dashboards). Requires: Playwright-compatible Chromium, cloudflared.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: MichaelLod v1.2.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 828 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

IntegrationPlaywrightAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/browser-login.mjs:268
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
      '--disable-setuid-sandbox',
      code literal

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 29 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 828 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 567: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 29 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill appears intended to help with browser login automation, but it exposes an authenticated browser session through a public tunnel with overly broad remote-control capabilities.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026