BB amazon-search
Search Amazon product listings for a keyword and return structured JSON results. Results are cached by ASIN/uuid for incremental searches and saved automatically to `results/`.
Search Amazon product listings for a keyword and return structured JSON results.
As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, running it twice, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostSKILL.md:17Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash
-
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegescripts/playwright_getcookie.ts:46Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)'--disable-setuid-sandbox',
code literal -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegescripts/playwright_search.ts:179Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)'--disable-setuid-sandbox',
code literal
Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "env"
Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 8 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1656 tokens
- low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- -32 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 176: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 12 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.