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DC wecom-agent-ops-center

企微 AI Agent 可观测性工具 — 心跳监控、进程守护、敏感信息扫描、网络白名单，2 分钟接入

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: mikeliang2000 v2.4.1 MIT-0 55 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 934 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

企微 AI Agent 可观测性工具 — 心跳监控、进程守护、敏感信息扫描、网络白名单，2 分钟接入

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
58/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
54
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 18

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 18
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key config.js:44
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key connector.js:55
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key core/secrets-scanner.js:111
    Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)
    pattern: /-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …/g,
    detectorheader only
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key core/secrets-scanner.js:117
    Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)
    pattern: /-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …/g,
    detectorheader only
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key core/secrets-scanner.js:123
    Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)
    pattern: /-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …/g,
    detectorheader only
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key msg-converter.js:20
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key test-msg-converter.js:7
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege deploy-pairing-server.sh:18
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    ssh $SERVER "sudo mkdir -p $REMOTE_DIR && sudo chown ubuntu:ubuntu $REMOTE_DIR"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege deploy-pairing-server.sh:30
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    ssh $SERVER "sudo tee /etc/systemd/system/pairing-server.service > /dev/null << 'EOF'
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process deploy-pairing-server.sh:48
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable pairing-server && sudo systemctl restart pairing-server"
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process deploy-v2.4.0.sh:63
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup node connector.js > logs/connector.log 2>&1 &
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:43
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…9dM/mwVgvbZJaSNaRk+bshk…Kbz+IoId…W0Q==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:74
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…SDq+2kAA…MOe/+5cdoEdg==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:86
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…GLw+xYSd…cqA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:126
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…FrF+LTRo…W3g==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:135
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…A6j+hAmM…GbS+kf5c…csw==",
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process README.md:83
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable --now wecom-agent-ops-center
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:99
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable --now wecom-agent-ops-center

Files scanned: 55. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "display_name"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 18 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 934 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 50: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -214 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 15 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly an ops connector, but it has unauthenticated message/admin endpoints and external data flows that need careful review before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 1 Jun 2026