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BB claw-mining

Mine $CLAW tokens via Proof of AI Work on Ethereum. Install this Skill and tell your agent 'mine CLAW' — the agent handles everything automatically. No technical knowledge required.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: minewithclaw v1.0.3 MIT-0 16 files body ≈ 3 149 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
78
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets miner/README.md:32
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `PRIVATE_KEY` | Miner wallet private key | (required) |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:20
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Risk: The skill can use a hot wallet private key to sign Ethereum transactions and spend gas. <br>
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:21
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Mitigation: Use only a dedicated low-balance hot wallet, never a main wallet or seed phrase, and inspect the exact code before running mining commands. <br>
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:157
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `PRIVATE_KEY` | Yes | — | Mining wallet private key (0x-prefixed hex). Stays local, never transmitted. |
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:177
      Reads a .env file
      set -a && source .env && set +a
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:275
      Reads a .env file (detector / deny-list definition; documentation table row)
      | `Missing required environment variable` | `.env` not loaded | Run `set -a && source .env && set +a` first, or check `.env` file exists |
      detectortable

    Files scanned: 16. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 39 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3149 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 181: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 30 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 39 items
    • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This appears to be a real CLAW mining skill, but it can automatically use a hot wallet private key to spend gas and call paid third-party APIs.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026