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Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Miraclemin v1.0.1 MIT-0 14 files body ≈ 3 388 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubTelegramInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
71
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:246
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "<cron expression> cd $SKILL_DIR/scripts && node prepare-digest.js 2>/dev/null | node deliver.js 2>/dev/null") | crontab -
Medium and low: 11
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url README.md:173
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getUpdates" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d['result'][0]['message']['chat']['id'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "No messages found —
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url README.zh-CN.md:167
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getUpdates" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d['result'][0]['message']['chat']['id'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "No messages found —
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/deliver.js:61
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    `https://api.telegram.org/bot${botToken}/sendMessage`,
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/deliver.js:78
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    `https://api.telegram.org/bot${botToken}/sendMessage`,
    placeholder
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:49
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…NxY+fzEC…TMw+Dfs3…h4g==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:108
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…9co+7Zrb…CSH/zJvXw56gmHw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:161
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Eg5+wW0/QaZM…swK/w2MWU+Gw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:205
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…uff+RtWa…OPA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:217
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…CUH+OiuIgU++RB0+94Nl…dMw==",
    detector
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:164
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getUpdates" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(d['result'][0]['message']['chat']['id'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "No messages found —
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:246
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "<cron expression> cd $SKILL_DIR/scripts && node prepare-digest.js 2>/dev/null | node deliver.js 2>/dev/null") | crontab -

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 85Steps. 87 steps, 2 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3388 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 178: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 29 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 87 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill behaves like a disclosed GitHub digest tool, but it stores local tokens and can schedule recurring delivery if the user enables it.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026