SKILLEMALL.ai

BD STT Recognizer | STT 识别器

语音转文字(Speech-to-Text / STT)工具。 支持从麦克风录音,使用 Whisper(faster-whisper)在本地进行语音转文字, 或通过 OpenAI 兼容 API 进行云端转写。 触发词:录音、语音转文字、STT、语音识别、转写、录音转文字。 适用平台:Linux / Windows / macOS。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Morois v1.0.8 MIT-0 8 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 897 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/transcribe.py:231
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (STT Recognizer | STT 识别器) differs from the folder (stt-recognizer)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 34 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1897 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 165: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 36 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
  • +4Has examples (24 code blocks)
  • +3All 4 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This speech-to-text skill appears purpose-built for recording and transcription, but it needs review because it can capture, save, and sometimes upload microphone audio without clear consent and privacy controls.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026