SKILLEMALL.ai

BD feishu-integration

飞书开放平台完整对接方案,支持文档管理、知识库操作、文件上传、Markdown导入、消息解析、OCR识别、群欢迎机器人等功能。包含tenant_access_token自动刷新机制,所有飞书API调用统一封装。Use when: (1) 需要操作飞书文档/知识库/文件,(2) 需要导入Markdown到飞书,(3) 需要解析飞书消息(富文本/引用/图片OCR),(4) 需要获取tenant_access_token,(5) 群聊新成员欢迎,(6) 任何飞书开放平台API调用。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 莫循 v1.0.0 MIT-0 36 files · 5 scripts body ≈ 1 541 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/token-management.md:33
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $FEISHU_TOKEN" ...
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention references/token-management.md:120
      Mentions editing / listing crontab
      # crontab -e
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/feishu-api.sh:21
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s -X GET "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/docx/v1/documents/${doc_token}" \
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/feishu-api.sh:30
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s -X GET "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/docx/v1/documents/${doc_token}/blocks" \
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/feishu-api.sh:40
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s -X PUT "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/docx/v1/documents/${doc_token}/content" \
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/feishu-api.sh:54
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s -X POST "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/docx/v1/documents/${doc_token}/content" \
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/feishu-api.sh:70
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s -X POST "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/docx/v1/documents/${doc_token}/blocks/batch_create" \
      vendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:43
      Mentions editing / listing crontab
      crontab -e

    Files scanned: 16. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: 飞书开放平台完整对接方案,支持文档管理、知识库操作、文件上传、Markdown导入、消息解析、OCR识别、群欢迎机器人等功能。包含t… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value

    Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 26 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1541 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -215 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 240: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 27 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
    • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
    • +3All 5 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This appears to be a real Feishu integration, but it ships with an exposed app secret and can make broad live changes in Feishu without strong safeguards.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026