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Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: mrben1 v1.0.0 MIT-0 9 files body ≈ 245 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 32/100 · Will not run — weak spots: steps, result and completion, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
47/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
79
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
32/100
Will not run
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 9
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets INSTALL.md:15
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - privateKey: your wallet private key
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:20
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Risk: The skill asks for a raw wallet private key and can spend gas from the configured wallet. <br>
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:38
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    **Other Properties Related to Output:** [Requires a configured Base-network wallet private key and RPC URL; optional image path may be uploaded during token creation.] <br>
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:38
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…jgR+Mkmf+D189…ihQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:65
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…9dM/mwVgvbZJaSNaRk+bshk…Kbz+IoId…W0Q==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:84
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…SDq+2kAA…MOe/+5cdoEdg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:119
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…FrF+LTRo…W3g==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:128
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…A6j+hAmM…GbS+kf5c…csw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token skill.js:7
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const CONTRACT_ADDRESS = "0xB1…309";
    quoted

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 32/100

  • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 245 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +4Structure: 0 headings, hard to scan
  • +3No numbered steps or checklist
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is purpose-built to deploy real Base-network tokens, but it asks for a raw wallet private key and can send irreversible transactions without a clear confirmation step.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026