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BD UTF-8发布基础设施

自动处理多平台中文编码问题的发布基础设施，集成防卡顿策略，支持Discord、GitHub等平台，遵循'防止勤务干扰'原则。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: mrpulorx2025-source v2.0.0 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 2 182 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureDiscordGitHubInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Secrets in code secret-github-token integration-test.js:12
    GitHub token (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const GITHUB_TOKEN = process.env.GITHUB_TOKEN || 'ghp_…53E';
    fixturequoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url cli.js:40
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    utf8…der test-discord https://discord.com/api/webhooks/... "测试消息"
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url integration-test.js:11
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (test fixture / example file; the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const DISCORD_WEBHOOK = process.env.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL || 'https://discord.com/api/webhooks/1482573744688857109/tD4x…Uq6';
    fixturevendor-hostquoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token integration-test.js:12
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const GITHUB_TOKEN = process.env.GITHUB_TOKEN || 'ghp_…53E';
    fixturequoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:154
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    'https://discord.com/api/webhooks/...',
    placeholder

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "read_when"

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (UTF-8发布基础设施) differs from the folder (utf8-encoder)
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 59 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2182 tokens
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 62: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -225 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 46 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 59 items
  • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill appears to be a real UTF-8 publishing helper, but it embeds live-looking Discord/GitHub credentials and can publish or persist content with too little user control.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: malicious · 28 May 2026