SKILLEMALL.ai
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DC social-scheduler

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Shilatdoesai v1.1.0 50 files body ≈ 6 642 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureDiscordInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
43/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 20

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 20
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/platforms/discord.js:21
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (detector / deny-list definition)
    'Expected format: https://discord.com/api/webhooks/ID/TOKEN\n\n' +
    detector
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/platforms/discord.js:187
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    configFormat: 'Webhook URL string: https://discord.com/api/webhooks/ID/TOKEN',
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv ANNOUNCEMENT.md:59
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv announcements/README.md:139
    Reads a .env file
    3. Copy .env.example to .env
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:22
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Enc/vzKw…pBK+z+KYh9…dU9+g2G+7zanTIGbw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:137
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…JbG+vnnQ…1TK+nxAp…hhm+kzE4…g4g==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:154
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-vuBv+fm2s…sik+GMDJ…gLl+u3Mo…feA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:184
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…pdo+E3+pCyA…t4i+W7OO…FT3+y5NZZfOOS/Bdcanm1MYA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:247
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…HxH+tv3k…kSo+8o0wxg9lZWw==",
    detector
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:34
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:425
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url RELEASE.md:87
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL=https://discord.com/api/webhooks/...
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/platforms/telegram.js:114
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    const url = `https://api.telegram.org/bot${botToken}/sendMessage`;
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/platforms/telegram.js:167
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    const url = `https://api.telegram.org/bot${botToken}/${method}`;
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/test.js:23
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    discord.validate('https://discord.com/api/webhooks/123/abc');
    fixturequoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-labelled-token scripts/test.js:95
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (placeholder value)
    api_key: 'molt…890'
    placeholder
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/test.js:95
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)
    api_key: 'molt…890'
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/test.js:164
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    config: 'https://discord.com/api/webhooks/123/abc'
    fixturequoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:248
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    - Message bot, then call: `https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getUpdates`
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:783
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    export DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL="https://discord.com/api/webhooks/..."
    placeholder

Files scanned: 50. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 6642 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 21 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6642 tokens
  • 85Steps. 166 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
  • -254 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -38 of 14 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 53 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 166 items
  • +4Has examples (97 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This social scheduler does what it advertises, but its local dashboard and queue storage can expose or misuse social-media credentials and scheduled posts without enough protection.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026