SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BB use-modular-wallets

Build crypto wallets using Circle Modular Wallets SDK with passkey authentication, gasless transactions, and extensible module architecture. Use when: creating crypto wallets with passkey-based (WebAuthn) registration and login, sending gasless transactions using Circle Gas Station paymaster, batching multiple transactions into a single user operation, implementing passkey recovery using BIP-39 mnemonic phrases, building advanced onchain wallets with custom modules (multisig, subscriptions, session keys). Triggers on: modular wallet, smart account, MSCA, passkey authentication, WebAuthn, gasless, paymaster, Gas Station, bundler client, user operation, userOp, ERC-4337, ERC-6900, account abstraction, toCircleSmartAccount, toPasskeyTransport, toModularTransport, sendUserOperation, batch transactions, 2D nonce, passkey recovery, EIP-1193 provider.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Madelyn v0.1.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 1 552 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, running it twice

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/passkey-recovery.md:3
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Reference implementation for setting up and executing wallet recovery using a BIP-39 mnemonic phrase to register a new passkey when the original is lost.
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:90
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      - NEVER reuse a recovery mnemonic phrase across multiple accounts.
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/passkey-recovery.md:89
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      throw new Error('Invalid recovery phrase')
      quoted

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 30 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1552 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 856: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a wallet-development guide with real asset and credential risks, but the behavior is disclosed, aligned with its purpose, and constrained by safety instructions.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026