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AB evidenceops

Forensic media triage with chain of custody. Use when receiving images, videos, audio, PDFs, or documents that need evidence-grade handling, integrity verification, and audit trails.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: msrovani v1.0.0 31 files body ≈ 2 726 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, consistency

ProcedureWhatsAppTelegramSecurityMedia and videoLegaltype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Secrets in code secret-labelled-token plugin-evidence-vault/tests/driver.test.ts:136
      Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (placeholder value)
      const input = 'api_key=sk-1…nop';
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal plugin-evidence-vault/tests/driver.test.ts:136
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)
      const input = 'api_key=sk-1…nop';
      placeholder
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal plugin-evidence-vault/tests/driver.test.ts:142
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      const input = 'password=Supe…123!';
      fixturequoted

    Files scanned: 24. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (evidenceops) differs from the folder (skill-evidenceops)
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 99 steps, 2 vague phrases
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2726 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 182: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 37 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 99 items
    • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This appears to be a real evidence-management skill, but it needs review because some strong security and chain-of-custody guarantees are not fully enforced in the implementation.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026