SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BC last30days

Research any topic across Reddit, X, YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, Hacker News, Polymarket, GitHub, Perplexity, and more. AI agent scores by upvotes, likes, and real money. Also triggered by 'last30'.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Matt Van Horn v3.0.0-open MIT-0 67 files body ≈ 613 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubYouTubeMarketingInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: last30days (ClawHub)

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash Read Write AskUserQuestion WebSearch
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention references/watchlist.md:92
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention references/watchlist.md:98
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/lib/bird_x.py:169
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    preexec = os.setsid if hasattr(os, 'setsid') else None
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/lib/bird_x.py:326
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    preexec = os.setsid if hasattr(os, 'setsid') else None
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/lib/vendor/bird-search/lib/twitter-client-base.js:88
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    authorization: 'Bearer AAAA…uTs%3D1Z…TnA',
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/lib/youtube_yt.py:230
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    preexec = os.setsid if hasattr(os, 'setsid') else None
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/lib/youtube_yt.py:455
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    preexec = os.setsid if hasattr(os, 'setsid') else None

Files scanned: 67. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (last30days) differs from the folder (last30days-v3-beta)
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 4 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 613 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -33 of 4 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 198: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real research/watchlist skill, but it has under-disclosed credential sharing, automatic package installation during setup, broad local persistence, and configurable outbound notifications that deserve review before install.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026