SKILLEMALL.ai

AC koreader-highlights

Use this skill when the user asks about reading highlights, book notes, annotations, or reading history from KOReader. Triggers: "what books", "show highlights", "latest highlights", "how many books", "find highlights about", "summarize highlights", KOReader, HighlightSync, .sdr.json. Read-only — only retrieves data, never modifies files, never does unrelated tasks.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: myugan v1.0.1 10 files body ≈ 1 048 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

ReferenceInfrastructureWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump HEARTBEAT.md
      Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (5) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
      HEARTBEAT.md, IDENTITY.md, MEMORY.md, SOUL.md, USER.md

    Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 16 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1048 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 6 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 368: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This highlights skill mostly does what it says, but it claims to be read-only while also telling the agent to save personal data and delete a setup file.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026