SKILLEMALL.ai

BB api-integration

Integrate third-party APIs with auth, retries, timeouts, and logging.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Mauricio Z. v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 448 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, consistency

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
When it triggers w 12
20
Consistency w 8
40
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell api-integration.md:43
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - Avoid `curl | sh` or ad-hoc install scripts as part of integration.
      quoted
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:53
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - Avoid `curl | sh` or ad-hoc install scripts as part of integration.
      quoted

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (api-integration) differs from the folder (api-integration-redhat)
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 29 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 448 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 69: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 29 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (0 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a small instruction-only API integration skill with sensible safety guidance, though its trigger metadata is malformed and the Red Hat branding is not verified.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026