SKILLEMALL.ai

FD crewai-team

使用 CrewAI 多 Agent 团队进行产品需求分析和 PRD 生成

Not recommendedlow grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Mr-ChenXY v1.0.0 MIT-0 30 files body ≈ 240 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 44/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
F
37/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
23
Quality 40%
57
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
44/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 17

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 17
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key run_discussion.py:15
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key run_hierarchical.py:15
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key run_interactive.py:15
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key run_minimal.py:15
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key run_mobile.py:15
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key run_openclaw.py:14
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key run_with_log.py:16
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SETUP.md:26
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export DASHSCOPE_API_KEY="sk-your-actual-key-here"' >> ~/.zshrc
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key team_config_discussion.py:16
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key team_config_hierarchical.py:21
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key team_config_minimal.py:16
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key team_config_mobile.py:16
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key team_config_multi_model.py:17
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key team_config_simple.py:16
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host USAGE.md:16
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SETUP.md:31
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv USAGE.md:29
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env

Files scanned: 30. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-short description under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 10 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 240 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 36: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 10 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 57.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This PRD-generation skill is mostly coherent, but it ships runnable scripts with a hard-coded external LLM API key and forced provider endpoint.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026