SKILLEMALL.ai

DB agent-watcher

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Ivan Cetta v1.0.5 2 files body ≈ 938 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, progress reporting

ReferenceAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
57/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
69/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:51
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    $posts = (Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "https://www.moltbook.com/api/v1/posts?author=…)&limit=3" -Headers $headers).posts
    quoted

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 18 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 938 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill’s behavior is coherent with monitoring Moltbook and saving selected discoveries, with no evidence of hidden execution or exfiltration.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026