SKILLEMALL.ai

BC clawra-selfie

Generate Clawra-style selfie images with a Qwen-first image backend (with optional Gemini and HF fallback) and send them to messaging channels via OpenClaw.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: nasplycc v1.1.3 MIT-0 10 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 953 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
77
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(curl:*)
      allowed-tools: Bash(npm:*) Bash(npx:*) Bash(openclaw:*) Bash(curl:*) Read Write WebFetch
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/clawra-selfie.sh:194
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      -X POST "https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/${GEMINI_IMAGE_MODEL}:generateContent?key=…" \
      placeholder

    A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (clawra-selfie) differs from the folder (nasplycc-clawra-selfie)
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 28 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 953 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • -32 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 156: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill mostly does what it claims, but it can generate images and send them to external channels from overly broad chat prompts without a clear confirmation step.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026