SKILLEMALL.ai

DC mercury-payments

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: nathan-deepmm v1.0.1 2 files body ≈ 1 189 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
58/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:15
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" "https://api.mercury.com/api/v1/accounts"
    vendor-host
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:33
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" "https://api.mercury.com/api/v1/recipients" | python3 -c "..."
    vendor-host
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:121
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" "https://api.mercury.com/api/v1/account/{id}/transactions?limit=500"
    vendor-host
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:124
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" "https://api.mercury.com/api/v1/account/{id}/transactions?start=…&end=…&limit=500"
    vendor-host

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 85Steps. 16 steps, 2 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1189 tokens
  • low The response is described with custom markup (6 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 17 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is documentation-only and purpose-aligned, but it gives an agent broad write-level banking authority with limited containment guidance, so users should review it carefully before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026