SKILLEMALL.ai

AB semanticfs

Search your local filesystem and codebase semantically. Use instead of grep/find/ls/cat chains when looking for files, functions, symbols, or code patterns. Returns exact file paths, line numbers, and code snippets. Much faster and uses far fewer tokens than manual file exploration.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Navneeth v0.1.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 896 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 78/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: progress reporting

ReferenceSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
78/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
Tools and files w 18
60
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:40
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Navneeth08k/semanticFS/main/scripts/install.sh | bash

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 78/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 23 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 896 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 283: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill’s local search purpose is coherent, but it asks users to install unreviewed live code and create a persistent searchable index and background local server without enough cleanup or access-boundary guidance.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026