SKILLEMALL.ai

BB cross-platform-content-syncer

Publish content once, distribute everywhere—sync WordPress, Substack, Medium, and LinkedIn automatically. Use when the user needs multi-channel publishing, content distribution, or unified editorial workflows.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: ncreighton v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 3 713 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice, progress reporting

ProcedureWordPressSlackInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:151
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL="https://hooks.slack.com/services/YOUR/WEBHOOK/URL"
      quoted
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:398
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      1. Verify SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL in `.env` (should start with `https://hooks.slack.com`)
      quoted

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 16 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 85Steps. 110 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3713 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 209: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 40 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 110 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is not malicious, but it asks for broad authority to publish, schedule, notify, analyze, and back up content across several third-party accounts.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026