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BD moltbot-security

Security hardening for AI agents - Moltbot, OpenClaw, Cursor, Claude. Lock down gateway, fix permissions, auth, firewalls. Essential for vibe-coding setups.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Next Frontier AI v1.0.3 4 files body ≈ 1 424 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentsSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:198
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
    security skill

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "keywords"

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, write) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1424 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 156: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +4Has examples (29 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent security-hardening guide, but it includes copy-paste commands that execute mutable internet scripts and make privileged system changes without enough safety checks.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026