SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BC coding-agent

Delegate coding tasks to Codex, Claude Code, or Pi agents via background process. Use when: (1) building/creating new features or apps, (2) reviewing PRs (spawn in temp dir), (3) refactoring large codebases, (4) iterative coding that needs file exploration. NOT for: simple one-liner fixes (just edit), reading code (use read tool), or any work in ~/clawd workspace (never spawn agents here). Requires a bash tool that supports pty:true.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: nickchan0412 v1.0.0 4 files body ≈ 2 477 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

AnalyzerSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 2 more places: ClawHub, ClawHub

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token index.js:10
      Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
      this.apiKey = "AIza…jk0";
    • medium Secrets in code secret-google-key index.js:10
      Google API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      this.apiKey = "AIza…jk0";
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token index.js:10
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      this.apiKey = "AIza…jk0";
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal index.js:10
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
      this.apiKey = "AIza…jk0";

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (coding-agent) differs from the folder (coding-agent-backup)
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
    • 100Steps. 23 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2477 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 437: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 19 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
    • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill needs review because it advertises local coding-agent delegation but includes a runnable Gemini API client that sends prompts to Google using a hardcoded API key, alongside high-authority autonomous agent examples.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026