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BC clawdship

Deploy websites and apps to clawdship.dev with zero signup. Use when user says "deploy", "host", "put this online", "publish site", "ship it", or wants to deploy a static site, Docker app, or any web project. Supports static sites and Dockerfile-based apps. No account needed — first deploy auto-creates everything.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: ndlz v1.0.1 3 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 096 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorDockerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use deploy.sh:31
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      CURL_ARGS+=(-H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY")
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:80
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAWDSHIP_API_KEY" https://api.clawdship.dev/v1/sites
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:83
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAWDSHIP_API_KEY" https://api.clawdship.dev/v1/sites/SITE_ID
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:86
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAWDSHIP_API_KEY" https://api.clawdship.dev/v1/sites/SITE_ID/redeploy
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:89
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s -X DELETE -H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAWDSHIP_API_KEY" https://api.clawdship.dev/v1/sites/SITE_ID
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:92
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAWDSHIP_API_KEY" https://api.clawdship.dev/v1/credits
      vendor-host

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 13 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1096 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 315: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a legitimate deployment helper, but it should be reviewed because it can upload local files, create public hosted resources, and exposes deletion and payment-related operations without strong guardrails.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026