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DC crypto-agent-payments

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: nicofains1 v0.1.7 2 files body ≈ 1 319 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
53/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:26
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Mitigation: Use only a dedicated low-value or testnet wallet, never paste a primary wallet private key into an agent chat or shell history, and require explicit human approval before any wallet action
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    Create wallets, transfer tokens, and enable payments between agents. Perfect for bug bounty programs, rewards systems, and agent-to-agent transactions.
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:70
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    1. First ask: "Do you have an existing wallet private key, or should I create a new one?"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:100
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    mcporter call 'onlyswaps.get_quote(fromToken: "0xEe…EeE", toToken: "0x83…913", amount: "1000000000000000", chainId: 8453)'
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:105
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    mcporter call 'onlyswaps.get_portfolio(userAddress: "0xd8…045")'
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:121
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    PRIVATE_KEY=0x... mcporter call 'onlyswaps.transfer(tokenAddress: "0x83…913", toAddress: "0xRe…ess", amount: "1000000", chainId: 8453)'
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:126
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    PRIVATE_KEY=0x... mcporter call 'onlyswaps.swap(fromToken: "0x83…913", toToken: "ETH", amount: "100000000", chainId: 8453, referrerAddress: "0xYo…let", extra
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:145
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    | Native (ETH) | 0xEe…EeE | 0xEe…EeE |

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 18 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1319 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 20 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is for crypto payments, but it asks agents to handle raw wallet private keys and run an unpinned external MCP server that can move real funds.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026