AC zeal-agent-wallet
Propose transactions to a Zeal Wallet. Use when the user wants to set up an agent as a Zeal Wallet signer, propose transactions, or manage a delegate wallet.
As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
How to improve
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
-
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:24High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…7pY+zoMV…h0x/Ptw8…8dg==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:39High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…b00+Gxjx…zRc/oZwU…hzA==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:99High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha512-vHk/hA7/1Ack…wbo+jaSh…Gtl+A5zq…HFg==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:129High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…Dsc+j03S…0oA==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:384High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…NS8+tHW7…WOF+PEzk…X4Q==",
detector
Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "emoji" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "requires"
Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Steps. 12 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 845 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 157: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 10 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
- +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
This wallet skill is functional but needs Review because it gives an agent persistent transaction-proposal authority while hiding important Safe/delegate details and allowing proposals without confirmation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026