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CD web-access

为AI Agent提供完整的互联网访问能力,支持多个主流平台

ClawHub Agent Skills author: nidhov01 v1.0.0 MIT-0 38 files · 1 script body ≈ 961 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 39/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
64/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
67
Quality 40%
60
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
39/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 9
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store cli.py:69
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    help="Auto-extract ALL platform cookies from browser (chrome/firefox/edge/brave/opera)")
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store cli.py:200
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    print("🍪 [dry-run] Would try to import cookies from Chrome/Firefox")
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url cli.py:820
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (string literal in code, not executed)
    print("  pip install --upgrade https://github.com/Panniantong/agent-reach/archive/main.zip")
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url cli.py:839
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (string literal in code, not executed)
    print("  pip install --upgrade https://github.com/Panniantong/agent-reach/archive/main.zip")
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url cli.py:913
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (string literal in code, not executed)
    print(f"  更新: pip install --upgrade https://github.com/Panniantong/agent-reach/archive/main.zip")
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc install.sh:119
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "$export_file" >> ~/.bashrc
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host cli.py:331
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (string literal in code, not executed)
    "curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash - 2>/dev/null && apt-get install -y -qq nodejs 2>/dev/null",
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell cli.py:412
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    ("Node.js", ["node"], "curl NodeSource setup | bash + apt install nodejs"),
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell cli.py:437
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    print("     https://nodejs.org/ or: curl -fsSL https://fnm.vercel.app/install | bash")
    detectorcode literal

Files scanned: 38. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-short description under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"

Process rating: all ten parameters 39/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (web-access) differs from the folder (07)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 33 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 961 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 30: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 31 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 33 items
  • +4Has examples (17 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 60.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill provides real web-access functionality, but it also imports and stores browser session cookies, changes the host environment, and installs itself into agent directories with insufficient consent and scoping.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026