SKILLEMALL.ai

BD batch-invoice-verify

批量识别并查验文件夹内发票,校验抬头、提示重复风险,生成最终清单

ClawHub Agent Skills author: ningmengyun12366 v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 2 010 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

批量识别并查验文件夹内发票,校验抬头、提示重复风险,生成最终清单

As a process D 44/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerExcelFinanceWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
44/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass batch-invoice-verify-install.md:44
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "<临时ps1脚本路径>"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:56
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "<临时ps1脚本路径>"

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-short description under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 56 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2010 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low The response is described with custom markup (9 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 32: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 17 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 56 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill appears built for invoice verification, but it asks the agent to fetch and run unverified remote software and handle an API key through chat.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 9 Jul 2026