BB apexapi
Call 120+ AI models and read the live web (scrape/crawl/extract) with one API key your agent can obtain and fund itself — card or USDC on Base, no human required.
Call 120+ AI models and read the live web (scrape/crawl/extract) with one API key your agent can obtain and fund itself — card or USDC on Base, no human…
As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
-
high Exfiltration
exfil-send-secrets-to-urlskill-card.md:21Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint (the skill's own vendor host)Mitigation: Keep the API key and claim token private, store them durably, and send the API key only to https://api.apexapi.dev. <br>
vendor-host
Medium and low: 1
-
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:46Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)curl https://api.apexapi.dev/agent/account -H "Authorization: Bearer $APEXAPI_KEY"
vendor-host
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 21 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1135 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 162: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 8 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
- +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.