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CD lws

Lightweight Wallet Signer CLI — generate wallets, derive addresses, and sign messages across EVM, Solana, Bitcoin, Cosmos, and Tron chains.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Neeraj Prasad v1.0.0 2 files body ≈ 651 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host skill.md:26
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dawnlabsai/lws/main/lws/install.sh | bash
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill.md:50
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Generate a new BIP-39 mnemonic phrase.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill.md:56
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - `--words` — Number of mnemonic words, 12 or 24 (default: `12`)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill.md:66
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - `--mnemonic` — BIP-39 mnemonic phrase (required)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill.md:78
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - `--mnemonic` — BIP-39 mnemonic phrase (required)

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 17 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 651 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 139: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This wallet-signing skill appears purpose-aligned, but its installer and seed phrase handling are risky enough to require review before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026