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BD license-pre-audit

进出口许可文档智能预审系统。支持 PDF 和图片处理：自动提取合同号、出口国、进口商、总金额、数量、重量、合格证编号、生产商、报关口岸等字段，检测公章，按审核规则执行审核，生成 MD 和 JSON 审核报告。支持 CLI 和对话交互两种方式触发。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: njkahn v1.3.0 MIT-0 28 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 255 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
83
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security src/utils/check-deps.js:28
    Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (string literal in code, not executed)
    const CHOCO_INSTALL_SCRIPT = 'Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force; [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor 3072; iex (
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security src/utils/check-deps.js:252
    Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (string literal in code, not executed)
    console.error('   2. 执行：Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force');
    code literal
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key src/utils/llm-client.js:315
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass src/utils/check-deps.js:28
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (string literal in code, not executed)
    const CHOCO_INSTALL_SCRIPT = 'Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force; [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor 3072; iex (
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass src/utils/check-deps.js:252
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (string literal in code, not executed)
    console.error('   2. 执行：Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force');
    code literal

Files scanned: 28. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 54 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2255 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -221 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 123: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 17 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 54 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This document-audit skill appears related to its stated purpose, but it can automatically modify the host system and send sensitive document contents to an LLM without a clear consent boundary.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026