SKILLEMALL.ai

DC normieclaw-legal-docs-pro

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Nollio v1.0.3 MIT-0 14 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 6 367 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
57/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Result and completion w 14
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Concealment medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Concealment en-hide-from-user SKILL.md:232
    Instruction to hide actions from the user ("do not tell the user <a claim>" — honesty guidance, not concealment)
    - Never tell the user a contract is "safe" in absolute terms — use "appears standard" or "no unusual provisions identified"
    honesty claim

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 6367 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Failures and branches. 12 branches
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6367 tokens
  • 80When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 85Steps. 156 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -213 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 43 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 156 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill’s legal-document purpose is coherent, but its helper scripts can be tricked into running local code and it stores sensitive business/legal data in plaintext.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026