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BB moralis-streams-api

Real-time blockchain event monitoring with webhooks. Use when user asks about setting up webhooks, real-time event streaming, monitoring wallet addresses, tracking token transfers in real-time, listening to all addresses on a chain, creating/updating/deleting streams, adding/removing addresses from streams, or receiving blockchain events as they happen. Supports all EVM chains. NOT for querying historical or current blockchain state - use moralis-data-api instead.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: nov v1.2.1 36 files body ≈ 2 947 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
70
Quality 40%
93
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
69/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 14

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 14
    • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/Tutorials.md:20
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "webhookUrl": "https://webhook.site/e04c…561",
      quoted
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash Read Grep Glob
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:324
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl "...?limit=100" -H "X-API-Key: $KEY"
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:327
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl "...?limit=100&cursor=<cursor>" -H "X-API-Key: $KEY"
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/MonitorMultipleAddresses.md:24
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "0xCF…60E",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/MonitorMultipleAddresses.md:25
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "0xAb…C9B"
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/MonitorMultipleAddresses.md:38
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "address": "0xCF…60E"
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/MonitorMultipleAddresses.md:47
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "0xCF…60E",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/MonitorMultipleAddresses.md:48
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "0xAb…C9B"
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/Tutorials.md:112
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "addressToAdd": ["0x5C…A6f"]
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/Tutorials.md:161
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "0x5C…A6f",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/Tutorials.md:162
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "0xC0…2Ac",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/Tutorials.md:163
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "0xcA…c73",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/Tutorials.md:164
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "0x57…b32"
      quoted

    Files scanned: 36. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 38 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2947 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 21 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 468: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 31 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 38 items
    • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (34 of 34)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a coherent Moralis Streams API helper, but it can use your Moralis API key to create, change, delete, and replay webhook streams.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026