SKILLEMALL.ai

DD meeting-assistant

Native macOS meeting automation for OpenClaw: calendar/window detection, prompt-before-recording, ScreenCaptureKit system audio + microphone recording, local whisper-cli transcription, and agent-generated meeting notes. No BlackHole or virtual audio device required. Use when you need automatic meeting detection, recording, transcription, and final summaries delivered by an OpenClaw agent.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: 不白 v1.0.4 MIT-0 21 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 970 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentsPersonal productivitytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
43/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
17
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup.sh:392
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$LAUNCH_AGENTS_DIR/com.meetingassistant.audiodaemon.plist" 2>/dev/null || true
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup.sh:399
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$LAUNCH_AGENTS_DIR/com.meetingassistant.scheduler.plist" 2>/dev/null || true
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup.sh:406
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$LAUNCH_AGENTS_DIR/com.meetingassistant.detector.plist" 2>/dev/null || true
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup.sh:416
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$LAUNCH_AGENTS_DIR/com.meetingassistant.calendar.plist" 2>/dev/null || true
Medium and low: 3
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/setup.sh:33
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)
    err "setup.sh 必须在完整仓库中运行,不能直接 curl | bash。"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:44
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    Clone the full repository first. `setup.sh` needs repository files and should not be run via `curl | bash`.
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup.sh:497
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "    launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.meetingassistant.XXX.plist  # 停止服务"
    detectorcode literal

Files scanned: 18. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (meeting-assistant) differs from the folder (nowhitestar-meeting-assistant)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1970 tokens
  • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 14 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 391: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real meeting-recording assistant, but it exposes sensitive recording and window-inspection controls too broadly for a desktop skill.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026