SKILLEMALL.ai
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DD web3-ops

Perform EVM Web3 on-chain operations: check addresses, scan portfolios, transfer assets, swap/bridge tokens, mint NFTs, custom raw tx, PnL tracking, Cutloss/Takeprofit monitor, RSI/EMA trading signals, GoPlus contract security audits, whale tracking, anti-MEV route routing, and wallet creation.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Nyxora AI v1.1.4 MIT-0 19 files · 14 scripts body ≈ 2 286 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 14 d ago

Perform EVM Web3 on-chain operations: check addresses, scan portfolios, transfer assets, swap/bridge tokens, mint NFTs, custom raw tx, PnL tracking…

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
55/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
52
Quality 40%
59
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Broad scope
If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 23

  • high Broad scope meta-requests-env-secret SKILL.md:1
    Skill asks the runtime to inject credential env vars into its sandbox: PRIVATE_KEY (high-value: PRIVATE_KEY) — verify each one is needed for the stated purpose
    required_environment_variables: PRIVATE_KEY
Medium and low: 22
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:69
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    *   **No Seed Phrase Handling**: The skill never requests, stores, or accesses mnemonics/seed phrases directly during active operations.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:31
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Mitigation: Do not place a main wallet private key or mnemonic in an agent-accessible environment; keep production keys outside the agent runtime.
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token actions/common.js:245
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    WETH: "0xC0…Cc2",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token actions/common.js:246
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    USDC: "0xA0…B48",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token actions/common.js:247
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    USDT: "0xdA…ec7"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token actions/common.js:252
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    WETH: "0x82…111",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token actions/common.js:253
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    USDC: "0xaf…831",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token actions/monitor.js:49
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    let usdcAddress = "0x83…913"; // Base USDC default
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token actions/signals.js:92
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    if (chainConfig.id === 1) targetAddress = "0xC0…Cc2"; // WETH
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token actions/signals.js:94
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    else if (chainConfig.id === 42161) targetAddress = "0x82…111"; // WETH Arb
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token actions/signals.js:95
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    else if (chainConfig.id === 137) targetAddress = "0x0d…270"; // WMATIC
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token actions/signals.js:96
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    else if (chainConfig.id === 56) targetAddress = "0xbb…95c"; // WBNB
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token actions/swapBridge.js:170
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    const UNIS…TER = "0xE5…564";
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token actions/swapBridge.js:226
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const PANC…TER = "0x13…Dd4";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token actions/whales.js:69
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    contractaddress: chainConfig.id === 1 ? "0xC0…Cc2" : undefined,
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:168
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (detector / deny-list definition)
    The system will automatically generate a new wallet and securely store your *Private Key* in the `.env` file. *(Don't forget to write down the Mnemonic/Seed Phrase displayed on your screen!)*
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:251
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    USDC    :   120.500000 (CA: 0x83…913)
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:252
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    AERO    :   415.000000 (CA: 0x94…631)
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:259
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    node index.js transfer --chain base --to 0x74…44e --amount 0.005
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:264
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    node index.js transfer --chain base --to 0x74…44e --amount 50 --token USDC
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:321
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "address": "0x61…81b",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:109
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    4.  **Display Copyable Addresses (CAs):** When printing token balances, portfolios, or transaction confirmations, format all contract addresses (CA) inside Telegram monospace code blocks (e.g. `` `0x9
    detector

Files scanned: 19. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: Perform EVM Web3 on-chain operations: check addresses, scan portfo… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "env"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requirements"

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
  • 85Steps. 40 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2286 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (49 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 295: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 40 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 59.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This crypto-wallet skill is purpose-built for on-chain operations, but it exposes fund-moving actions and wallet secrets to AI-connected workflows without strong enough safety boundaries.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 16 Sept 2026