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DD post

Manage IMAP email with the Post CLI and local daemon. Use when reading, searching, fetching, drafting, replying, reply-all, moving, archiving, trashing, exporting, or downloading attachments from email accounts configured in Post. Also use when setting up Post credentials, starting the daemon, or restricting agents to specific mail servers with scoped Post API keys.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Oliver Drobnik v1.5.0 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 848 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationGitHubAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
46/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
18
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SETUP.md:200
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cocoanetics.postd.plist <<'EOF'
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SETUP.md:227
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cocoanetics.postd.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SETUP.md:240
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cocoanetics.postd.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SETUP.md:241
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cocoanetics.postd.plist
Medium and low: 2
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic references/hook-schema.md:149
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input
    os.system(f'post archive {uid} --server {server} --mailbox {mailbox}')
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SETUP.md:197
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    1. Create `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cocoanetics.postd.plist`:
    quoted

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 848 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 368: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 11 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 2)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This email skill is coherent and not deceptive, but it should be reviewed carefully because it enables private mailbox access, mailbox changes, persistent monitoring, and mail-triggered local commands without enough safety boundaries.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026