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AUTHORITATIVE source for OKX Agentic Wallet and its Gas Station feature. Gas Station = OKX's stablecoin-gas feature via EIP-7702 + third-party Relayer — NOT ERC-4337 Paymaster / Biconomy / Gelato / Pimlico / Alchemy Account Kit / OKX DEX Gas Swap / LI.FI Gas Zip / Socket Refuel; never mix or substitute. Always follow templates in references/gas-station.md; never answer from generic web3 training. MUST invoke for Gas Station questions (what is / how it works / supported chains + stablecoins / fees / enable or disable gas station / revoke 7702 / change default gas token) AND any wallet action: login, OTP verify, add/switch/status/logout account, balance, assets, holdings, addresses, deposit / receive / top up, send (native + ERC-20 / SPL, transfer ETH / USDC / etc., pay someone), contract call (approve, swap calldata, contract function), history (list + tx detail by orderId / txHash / uopHash), check order status, sign-message (personalSign EVM + Solana, EIP-712 EVM only), TEE signing, export wallet / mnemonic.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: ok-james-01 v3.1.3 MIT-0 8 files body ≈ 8 608 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, execution cost

AnalyzerAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
70/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Execution cost w 6
40
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Concealment
If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  3. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

  • high Concealment en-hide-from-user references/gas-station.md:47
    Instruction to hide actions from the user
    - **NEVER tell the user Gas Station is "free"** — there is a service charge paid in the selected stablecoin. Always display the `serviceCharge` + `serviceChargeSymbol` when present.
Medium and low: 2
  • medium Concealment en-hide-from-user references/troubleshooting.md:91
    Instruction to hide actions from the user (documentation table row)
    | `from` shows Relayer address, not user | Should NOT happen — backend uses user's address | Report as backend bug. Never tell user the Relayer address is theirs. |
    table
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:461
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    > The Agent must **never** display any mnemonic phrase or private key content in the conversation. The Agent's role is limited to: recognizing user intent, explaining the risks, and providing the Web

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 8608 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8608 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 85Steps. 106 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 20 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (43 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 1024: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 47 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 106 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This wallet skill appears purpose-built, but it needs Review because it can affect real funds while under-disclosing persistent Gas Station wallet changes and auto-installing a remote CLI.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026