SKILLEMALL.ai

BC app-store-screenshots

App Store and Google Play screenshot creation with exact platform specs. Covers iOS/Android dimensions, gallery ordering, device mockups, and preview videos. Use for: app store optimization, ASO, app screenshots, app preview, play store listing. Triggers: app store screenshots, aso, app store optimization, play store screenshots, app preview, app listing, ios screenshots, android screenshots, app store images, app mockup, device mockup, app gallery, store listing

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Ömer Karışman v0.1.5 2 files body ≈ 2 094 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureDesigntype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:14
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh && infsh login

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 25 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2094 tokens
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 467: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 29 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill’s main purpose is coherent, but its install instructions ask users to run mutable remote code directly and optional unpinned package commands.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026