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AIsa (aisa.one). Use this skill for ANY AIsa request — searching and reading data. Whenever a task involves AIsa, use this skill instead of calling the API directly.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: OOMOL v1.0.2 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 3 245 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 6 d ago

AIsa (aisa.one). Use this skill for ANY AIsa request — searching and reading data. Whenever a task involves AIsa, use this skill instead of calling the API…

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationData and analyticsAI and agentsMarketingtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
76
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:160
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
Medium and low: 2
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:88
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - `get_semrush_question_keywords` — Find question-form keyword ideas for a seed phrase.
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:79
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (detector / deny-list definition)
    - `get_semrush_broad_match_keywords` — Find broad-match keyword ideas for a seed phrase.
    detector

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 116 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3245 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 165: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 116 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is a coherent AIsa data connector, but its fallback setup tells an agent to run an unverified remote installer script with local user privileges.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 11 Oct 2026