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BC Computer

The universal computer skill - hardware diagnostics, system performance, computational tasks, binary operations, and everything about the physical machine. Use for computer management, optimization, troubleshooting, and understanding the machine itself.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: openlang v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 3 145 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
73
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:334
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      echo "performance" | sudo tee /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/cpufreq/scaling_governor
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:337
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      echo "powersave" | sudo tee /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/cpufreq/scaling_governor
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:347
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      echo 3 | sudo tee /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:360
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      echo noop | sudo tee /sys/block/sda/queue/scheduler
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:363
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      echo 0 | sudo tee /sys/block/sda/queue/read_ahead_kb
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:315
      Mentions editing / listing crontab
      crontab -l                  # 当前用户计划任务
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:316
      Mentions editing / listing crontab
      crontab -e                  # 编辑

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 25 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3145 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 253: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 59 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
    • +4Has examples (58 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This instruction-only skill is not malicious, but it gives very broad system administration guidance with weak safety boundaries around high-impact actions.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026